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Abstract
Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking
industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Bank-
ing and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic
consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Less well docu-
mented, but equally important, was the continuing entry of new banks, tempering
the decline in the overall number of banking institutions. This paper examines
whether deregulation affected bank new-charter, failure, and merger rates during
the 1980s and 1990s after controlling for bank performance and state economic
activity. We find evidence that intrastate deregulation stimulated new charters and
mergers, but not failures. Moreover, we find little evidence that interstate deregu-
lation affected new charters, failures, or mergers.
Keywords: commercial banks, new charters, failures, mergers
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1. Introduction 
The twentieth century witnessed two periods of dramatic regulatory and structural change in the 
U.S. banking industry – the Great Depression and the events of the 1980s and 1990s. While 
many important regulations were enacted during the Great Depression, the 1980s and 1990s 
experienced the repeal or reversal of most depression-era financial regulations. The 1980s and 
early 1990s experienced severe financial turbulence – the savings and loan debacle followed by 
the crisis in the commercial banking industry. Those crises led to failure rates among financial 
institutions not seen since the Great Depression. As a consequence, the 1980s and 1990s saw 
deregulation that transformed the banking industry from one with much geographic limitation on 
banking and branching to one now characterized by interstate banking and branching.1 
The theory of industrial organization addresses several stylized facts or empirical 
regularities of industry dynamics: (1) entry is common; (2) entry is small scale; (3) survival is 
low-probability, and (4) entry and exit are highly correlated (see Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 
1988, and Pepall, Richards, and Norman 2002, Ch. 6). Moreover, the fourth empirical regularity 
contradicts standard microeconomic theory where entry associates with high-performing, 
profitable, expanding industries while exit associates with low-performing, unprofitable, 
contracting industries. The empirical evidence implies that the process resembles a lottery where 
many firms buy tickets (i.e., enter the market), most firms eventually lose (i.e., exit the market), 
 
1 Conventional wisdom suggests that the emergence of interstate banking and branching generated a significant 
increase in mergers and acquisitions (Rhoades 2000, and Jeon and Miller 2002a). One view of the consolidation 
process in the banking industry suggests that it is by and large a positive event  -- banks became more efficient 
(Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997, 1998) and better-run banks increased their market share (Stiroh and Strahan, 2002). 
Another view sees a possible negative effect of consolidation on the availability of loans to small businesses (Ely 
and Robinson, 2001). Still another view notes that recent merger activity increased measures of industry 
concentration and profitability, where concentration temporally led profitability (Jeon and Miller 2002b). Together, 
failures and mergers led a large exodus of institutions from the banking industry. New charters counterbalanced that 
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and only a few firms win (i.e., stay in the market). In other words, long-term, permanent 
penetration into an existing market presents significant barriers and few firms succeed, since 
incumbent firms possess significant advantages (Urban, Carter, Gaskin, and Mucha 1984, and 
Pepall, Richards, and Norman 2002, Ch. 6). 
The commercial banking industry during the recent two-decade period of deregulation 
experienced those standard empirical regularities with some variations. That is, entry occurred 
frequently and generally involved small banks. A minority of banks survived. The number of 
entries and exits both increased dramatically during the last two decades, although exits typically 
exceeded entries as the number of banks traversed a downward trend. In addition, exits in the 
regulated banking industry generally involve mergers, even for failing banks.2 
The U.S. commercial banking industry possesses institutional characteristics that affected 
how the industry dynamics corresponded to and differed from those empirical regularities. First, 
the founding fathers exhibited much concern about preventing concentrations of power. They 
adopted rules and regulations, attempting to prevent such concentrations of power from 
emerging. That concern bore fruit in the banking industry in the peculiar pattern of bank charters 
– a dual banking system – and the regulation of banking activity on a geographic basis. Thus, as 
we entered the last two decades of the 20th century, the U.S. possessed many more banks per 
capita than most other countries in the world. The deregulation of geographic restrictions on 
banking activity expectedly led to a decline in the number of banks. Thus, although both entries 
and exits played a significant role over the last two decades, exits generally exceeded entries so 
 
movement to some extent. 
2 Our data on mergers, however, include only unassisted mergers while failures include government-assisted 
mergers and outright failures. 
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that the total number of banks fell, as noted above. 
Second, the banking industry plays a critical role in any nation’s economy. The loss of 
confidence in the banking industry that led to subsequent bank panics and runs provided the 
typical scenario for recession and depression throughout the 19th century. Consequently, the 
banking industry in the 20th century exhibited significant control on entry and exit by the various 
banking regulators. That is, the number of bank entries and exits probably fell below those that 
would have naturally occurred in an unregulated banking industry. 
Finally, exits encompass two different events – failures and mergers. Banks cannot freely 
exit; they must place themselves in the hands of the regulators. In addition, experience shows 
that the predominant form of exit occurs through merger, and not failure. In other words, the 
regulatory environment probably increased the number of mergers and reduced the number of 
failures relative to an unregulated banking industry. 
This paper focuses on important elements of those events – births (new charters), deaths 
(failures), and marriages (mergers) -- in the commercial banking industry. Our analysis contains 
two foci. First, we consider the effects, if any, of regulatory control over the evolution of the 
U.S. banking industry by examining births, deaths, and marriages in each state. Specifically, 
variables that capture the effects of intrastate and interstate branching and merger regulation may 
possess important effects on the dynamic evolution of the banking industry. Moreover, our 
findings are conditioned on private business decisions such as portfolio and income statement as 
well as state-specific business cycle effects. Two findings stand out. One, the more-permissive 
intrastate branching regulation correlates positively with new charters and mergers, but does not 
significantly affect failures. Two, at the same time, interstate banking and branching regulation 
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do not generally exhibit significant effects on births, deaths, and marriages. The exception, the 
most-recent, more-permissive national interstate deregulation does associate with more merger 
activity. 
Second, we also employ temporal causality tests to consider the timing relationships 
between births, deaths, and marriages. We find that mergers temporally lead new charters, 
supporting the findings of Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White (1999) and Keeton (2000), but 
countering those of Seelig and Critchfield (1999). In addition, failures also temporally lead 
mergers, suggesting a “demonstration effect”. In other words, bank failures signal to other weak 
banks that they should seek merger partners, sooner rather than later. 
The paper progresses as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of regulatory and 
structural change over the past 25 years. Section 3 examines the existing literature that considers 
new charters, failures, and mergers. Section 4 offers an intuitive explanation of bank births, 
failures, and marriages, describes the database, and outlines the empirical tests. Section 5 
discusses the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Regulatory and Structural Change: An Overview 
The regulatory environment within which the U.S. commercial banking industry operates has 
undergone significant adjustment in the last twenty years, including, but not limited to, the 
Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, the Depository 
Institution Act of 1982, and the Interstate Banking and Branching efficiency Act of 1994.3 
 
3 Our historical discussion of banking regulation relies heavily on Kane (1996) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  
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Because of its regulatory history, the U.S. banking industry possesses many more independent 
institutions than is the norm in the rest of the world.4  
Early in U.S. banking history, commercial banks received their charters from individual 
states and could not operate across state lines. The passage of the National Banking Act of 1864 
established the chartering of national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency, but this new 
legislation, although silent on the issue of branching by the national banks, was interpreted as 
conforming to existing prohibitions against branching across state borders. The McFadden Act 
of 1927 and the Banking Act of 1933 generally prohibited branching across state lines.5  
Turning our attention to intrastate banking, state legislation has generally liberalized its 
rules on branch banking within states’ borders. Historically, states were divided into three 
groups: (i) those states that permitted statewide branching with few restrictions, (ii) those states 
that permitted limited statewide branching with numerous restrictions, and (iii) those states that 
 
4 At the other extreme, Canada currently has 8 domestic banks and 43 foreign banks. The domestic banks 
experienced a recent fall from 11 to 8 with the loss of the three smallest banks. Although relative large in number, 
foreign banks held just over 1 percent of total Canadian bank assets at the end of 1998. Information on the number 
and size of banking operations comes from the web site of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/AndreE/Index.htm. The U.S., on the other hand, had 8,774 banks at the end of 1998. 
The U.S. banking data used come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on-line data posted at 
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob. 
5 Several loopholes existed, however, in the legal landscape. First, a number of banks already operated across state 
lines at the time of the McFadden Act legislation. Those institutions’ operations were grandfathered. But second, 
and more important, bank holding companies were permitted to acquire banks across state lines. The Douglas 
Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 partially closed that second loophole, unless such cross-
state acquisitions by bank holding companies were explicitly permitted by the states involved. Maine first mined 
that remaining loophole in 1975 when it adopted legislation permitting out-of-state bank holding companies to 
acquire Maine banks, if reciprocity existed in the states of the acquiring holding companies. But substantial 
movement did not really begin until 1982 when New York passed similar reciprocity legislation and Massachusetts 
passed regional reciprocity legislation restricted to the New England states. The overture by New York led to a 
patchwork of regional reciprocity pacts over the next few years. Most states participated in one or more regional 
packs with California, New York, and Texas as notable exceptions (exclusions). Although banks were permitted to 
acquire failed thrift institutions across state lines as a result of the savings and loan crisis, the bulk of bank mergers 
across state lines still proceeded through bank holding companies. Finally, and most recently, the Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted banks to acquire banks in other states.  
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permitted only unit banking with essentially no branching activity. Legislative activity gradually 
reduced the number of states to a very few that have unit banking or limited branching. 
Branching and merger restrictions were originally promulgated to prevent banking 
institutions from monopolizing credit markets. That same legislation, however, frequently 
granted local monopoly power to smaller community banks. Thus, the relaxation of restrictions 
on interstate and intrastate banking and branching may lead to the acquisition of a large number 
of small community banks. An important policy concern associated with such a prospect is the 
effect on the supply of credit to small businesses, organizations that many see as the real engines 
of growth (Ely and Robinson, 2001). 
In sum, economic events, individual bank performance, and regulatory change have 
produced merger and failure activity in the U.S. commercial banking industry not seen since the 
Great Depression. Furthermore, many new commercial banks entered the market with new 
charters, tending to moderate the decline in the number of banking institutions. 
3. Literature Review 
Several papers explore the recent activity in new charters, failures, and mergers, although none 
consider all three activities together. Amos (1992) examines the regional pattern of commercial 
bank failures during the 1980s (i.e., 1982 to 1988). He uses the state as his level of observation 
and generates a cross-section sample of 50 observations by averaging the bank failure data 
across the 1982 to 1988 period. He introduces regulatory (e.g., dummy variables for branching 
regulation) and state-level macroeconomic variables (e.g., gross state product, sectoral 
composition of gross state product) to explain the pattern of bank closings. He concludes that 
states experience higher failure rates when the state’s economy possesses a larger share in oil 
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and gas extraction and more volatility in economic variables. He finds little evidence suggesting 
that failures correlate with the branching status dummy variables or states with higher 
concentrations of farming or manufacturing.  
Cebula (1994) modifies and improves Amos’s (1992) analysis in three ways. He 
introduces bank financial variables in addition to the state-level economic and regulatory 
variables. He also extends the sample through 1992 and adjusts the regression analysis for 
heteroskedasticity. He follows Amos (1992) and averages the data over the 1982 to 1992 period 
and performs cross-section regressions with 50 observations. He derives several additional 
general conclusions. States with higher capital ratios and lower net charge-offs to loans correlate 
with lower failure rates. More limited evidence emerges that easier regulation on branching and 
a higher average cost of funds associates with a higher bank-closing rate. 
Amos (1992) and Cebula (1994) both consider the effect of intrastate branching regulation 
on the bank failure rate. Amos includes dummy variables for statewide and unit branching states, 
finding no significant effects. Cebula substitutes a dummy variable for limited branching states, 
implying that statewide and unit banking states come from the same specification. He finds that 
the failure rate was significantly lower in limited branching states. Cebula also includes a 
dummy variable for those states that prohibited interstate banking, but the coefficient on that 
interstate banking dummy variable is not significant. 
Chou and Cebula (1996) perform a similar analysis of the failure rates across states for the 
savings and loan industry. They consider savings and loan failures in each state over the 1985 to 
1988 period relative to the average number of savings and loans in operation from 1984 to 1988. 
Since some of the observations on the failure rate are zero, they use the Tobit model with 
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heteroskedastic errors. They find that four types of variables correlate significantly with the 
failure rate – regional economic conditions (e.g., the average growth rate of GSP), financial 
variables (e.g., the average cost of funds), regulatory structure (e.g., federally chartered stock 
institutions to all FSLIC-insured institutions), and political variables (e.g., dummy variables 
indicating that states had representation on the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Committee or the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee). Their most robust 
findings include the following: failure rates associate negatively with the growth rate of gross 
state product, positively with the average cost of funds, positively with the proportion of stock 
(rather than mutual) associations, and negatively with federally chartered (rather than state 
chartered) stock associations. 
Stiroh and Strahan (2002) consider the effects of intrastate and interstate branching and 
banking deregulation on exit dynamics, by which they mean mergers and failures. They find 
some evidence that the exit (merger plus failure) rate rose after deregulation of intrastate and 
interstate branching and banking. Their findings, unlike Amos (1992), Cebula (1994), Chou and 
Cebula (1996), or our paper, do not control for other possible correlates with the exit rate. 
DeYoung (1999) explores the life cycle of de novo banks in the U.S. since 1980. He finds 
that newly chartered banks possess lower failure rates than existing commercial banks during the 
first few years of operation. But, their failure rate rises to exceed that of existing banks after 
those first few years and then converges back to the failure rate of established banks over time. 
DeYoung then proposes a simple life-cycle model of de novo bank failure and tests that theory 
with a hazard model for a sample of 303 newly chartered banks. The initial capitalization of de 
novo banks explains their initial lower failure rate when they earn negative net incomes. The 
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capital cushion, however, disappears before net income becomes positive and stable enough to 
stave off failure for those de novo banks that do fail. DeYoung concludes that if the policy 
objective focuses on eliminating the failure of newly chartered commercial banks, then 
regulators should increase the initial capital requirements for de novo entry. Significant increases 
of capital requirements, however, may too severely restrict the number of de novo entries in 
DeYoung’s view. In other words, regulators should not prevent all bank failures. 
Amel and Liang (1997) apply a two-equation model of entry and performance 
(profitability) to the U.S. commercial banking industry. They examine the hypothesis that bank 
entry limits persistent above-average profits in a competitive environment. By entry, they mean 
new banks (new charters) or new branches. Their database includes the entry of new banks and 
new branches into local banking markets from 1977 to 1988 – over 4,000 entries into 2,300 local 
banking markets. They conclude that the competitive process exists in the U.S. commercial 
banking industry, where higher profits attract entry and entry reduces profits. Moreover, market 
size and growth, measured by population and its growth, correlate positively with bank entry. 
Finally, legal branching restrictions play a minor role in explaining bank entry. 
Another group of papers consider the temporal relationship between new entrants and 
mergers. Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White (1999), Keeton (2000), and Seelig and 
Critchfield (1999) investigate whether new bank entrants fill a void left by bank mergers. That 
is, new entrants provide services to small businesses and other bank customers formerly 
provided by banks that have now merged into larger organizations.6 That conventional wisdom 
 
6 Keeton (2000) uses that cause-and-effect argument. An alternative hypothesis views increased merger activity as a 
signal that bank charters go at a premium. Thus, new entrants acquire a bank charter solely to have it acquired by 
another bank through merger. 
  11
                                                
implies that bank mergers lead to new entrants. Seelig and Critchfield (1999) challenge 
conventional wisdom with their empirical findings that mergers dissuade entry. Berger, Bonime, 
Goldberg, and White (1999) support conventional wisdom with their empirical results. Most 
recently, Keeton (2000) also finds support for the mergers-imply-new-entrants hypothesis. 
Moreover, he criticizes the methods of the previous two papers and offers an improved method. 
Keeton (2000) concludes that “… new bank formations may offset some of the harmful effects 
of mergers, making it more likely that banking consolidation is beneficial on balance.” (p. 35). 
4. Descriptive Model, Database, and Empirical Tests 
Descriptive Model 
The dynamic structure of industries evolves as firms enter, exit, and merge. Entry and exit of 
firms provide the key elements to the efficient operation of a competitive market.7 In the banking 
industry, the experience of the nineteenth century shows that many recessions associated with 
bank (financial) panics, where the private sector lost confidence in the banking industry. In sum, 
while free entry and exit makes most markets work efficiently, such freedom can lead to a loss of 
confidence in the banking industry and precipitate a banking panic. Thus, traditionally regulators 
control entry into, exit from, and merger within the banking industry. 
Competitive markets experience the entry (birth) of new firms, the exit (death) of existing 
firms, and the merger (marriage) of existing firms as a consequence of the individual 
performance of the firms in an industry as well as the aggregate performance of the overall 
economy. In other words, births, deaths, and marriages of firms within an industry depend on the 
 
7 Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) discover for the U.S. banking industry that “severe restrictions imposed on the 
geographic scope of banks retarded the natural process of selection whereby better-managed, lower-cost banks 
expand at the expense of inefficient ones.” (p. 240). 
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general state of the economy as well as managerial decisions within firms that produce those 
firms’ performances. Better average individual firm performance and/or a more vibrant overall 
economy probably generates more births, fewer deaths, also an ambiguous effect on marriages. 
In the banking industry, we must consider the effects of regulation, in addition to the 
performances of the average individual bank and the overall economy. The deregulation 
instituted over the last 25 years in the U.S. weakened restrictive policies that permitted many 
mergers both within and between states. As banks merged and grew bigger, a niche opened for 
new bank entry, which the new, more-relaxed regulatory environment aided and abetted. Finally, 
since deregulation increases competition, competitive pressures force weak, poor-performing 
banks to improve their performance or leave the industry through mergers or failures.8 In sum, 
deregulation should, holding other things constant, generate increases in births, deaths, and 
marriages. The empirical work that follows examines the effects of individual bank performance 
(more precisely the average performance of banks within each state), the state economy’s 
performance, and deregulation on births, deaths, and marriages in the U.S. banking industry. 
Database 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reports balance sheet and income statement data 
aggregated for each state and the District of Columbia.9 We supplement this data with state-level 
macroeconomic information on population and the unemployment rate.10 Our cross-section time-
series database includes the 50 states and the District of Columbia over 21 years from 1978 to 
 
8 Winston (1998), in a recent survey, provides a good discussion of the effects of deregulation on the dynamics of 
industry structure. 
9 The commercial bank balance sheet and income data on a state-by-state basis come from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/). 
10 The Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/statepop.html) and the Bureau of Labor 
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1998 – a pooled data set of 1071 observations. We also perform temporal causality tests between 
new-charter, failure, and merger rates using data from 1969 to 1998 across the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia – a pooled data set of 1530 observations. 
Our analysis examines the determinants of birth, death, and marriage rates as measured 
by the ratio of new charters, failures, and mergers to total banks in each state (and the District of 
Columbia) for each year. Our explanatory variables fall into three categories – branching and 
merger deregulatory variables, state-level bank information, and state-level economic data. 
Several variables capture the regulatory stance of states with respect to mergers and 
acquisitions on an intrastate and interstate basis. Two variables capture intrastate deregulation. 
The ratio of branches to banks measures the effective regulatory stance in the state with respect 
to branching.11 A dummy variable captures intrastate multibank holding company activity. Three 
dummy variables capture interstate deregulatory activity – that is, the regulatory stance in each 
state vis-à-vis bank mergers through multibank holding companies across states. A state could 
allow out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire banks within its borders with or without 
conditions (reciprocity). For example, some states allow bank holding companies from other 
states to acquire a bank within its borders only for the set of states that also allow bank holding 
companies from this state to acquire banks within their borders. All such regulations became 
abrogated with the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching efficiency Act of 1994, 
which permitted bank holding company operations on a national basis without geographic 
restrictions. The first dummy variable is one if a state possesses regional reciprocity, zero 
 
Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/top20.html) report population and unemployment rate data on a state-by-state basis. 
11 Many studies include dummy variables for unit, limited, and statewide branching regulation. Kaparakis, Miller, 
and Noulas (1994) use the ratio of branches to banks to categorize states into these three categories. We use the 
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otherwise; the second is one if a state possesses national reciprocity, zero otherwise; and the 
third is one if a state possesses national non-reciprocity, zero otherwise.12 
The financial variables fall into three categories – portfolio allocation decisions, income 
and expense factors, and risk variables. Our specification uses crude portfolio allocation 
decisions -- equity to assets, loans to assets, deposits to assets. In addition, we introduce more 
refinement in portfolio allocation effects – real estate loans to loans, commercial and industrial 
loans to loans, consumer loans to loans, and non-interest-earning deposits to deposits.  
The income and expense variables measure the interest rate paid on liabilities, the interest 
rate earned on assets, and so on. More specifically, those variables include average interest cost 
(interest expense to liabilities), average non-interest cost (non-interest expense to liabilities), 
non-interest expense to total (interest and non-interest) expense, average interest revenue 
(interest revenue to assets), average non-interest revenue (non-interest revenue to assets), and 
non-interest revenue to total (interest and non-interest) income. Also, net charge-offs to loans 
measures the riskiness of the portfolio. Finally, state-level economic information includes the 
unemployment rate, the population, and the population growth rate. 
Empirical Tests 
We extend the analysis of Amos (1992) and Cebula (1994) by employing pooled data, using 
more information on the balance sheet and income statement data of the banking system, and 
examining births, deaths and marriages within the commercial banking industry. Moreover, we 
 
actual ratio of branches to banks to capture the branching regulatory effect. This measure captures the actual effect 
of regulatory practices of state branching regulations. 
12 Amel (1993) provides the initial specification for the three dummy variables. Daniels and Tirtirogul (1998) 
updated Amel’s specification through 1995. We extend the dummy variables to 1998, where national non-
reciprocity was legislated to become effective in September 1995. We code all states to possess national non-
reciprocity in 1996 to 1998. 
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adopt pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), pooled Tobit, and random-effects Tobit 
specifications both with and without robust or bootstrap estimation techniques. 
The dependent variables in our regression analysis include the birth rate [new charters to 
total banks (CH/BK)], the death rate [failures to total banks (FL/BK)], and the merger rate 
[mergers to total banks (MG/BK)]. We collect the banking data in each state (and the District of 
Columbia) in each year from 1966 to 1998; the state-level economic data cover 1978 to 1998. 
For each dependent variable, we implement two different regression analyses – looking 
for correlates with the dependent variables; and looking for timing relationships between the 
dependent variables themselves. For the first set of regressions, we include the same set of 
independent variables for each dependent variable. We include branching and merging 
regulatory variables,13 portfolio allocation variables,14 and state-level macroeconomic variables.15 
16 Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our econometric work. 
For the second time-series analysis, we regress each dependent variable onto lagged 
values of itself and lagged values of the other dependent variables. We then perform tests to 
 
13 Variables include the average number of branches per bank (BR/BK), dummy variable for when a state introduces 
multibank holding company activity within its borders (MBH), dummy variable for states with regional interstate 
bank holding company merger legislation (DREG) (In all cases save Oregon for several years, the regional bank 
holding merger legislation involves reciprocity. Oregon does not. We include Oregon with the other states with 
regional reciprocity legislation.), dummy variable for states with national interstate bank holding company 
legislation with reciprocity (DNATR), and dummy variable for states with national interstate bank holding company 
legislation without reciprocity (DNATNR). 
14 Variables include loans to assets (L/A), real estate loans to loans (REL/L), consumer loans to loans (CL/L), 
commercial and industrial loans to loans (CIL/L) deposits to assets (D/A), non-interest bearing deposits to deposits 
(DNI/D), and equity to assets (EQ/A); a risk variable – net charge-offs to loans (NCOFF/L); income and expense 
variables – non-interest income to income (NIY/Y), non-interest expense to expense (NIE/E), average interest cost 
(AIC, defined as interest expense to liabilities), average interest revenue (AIR, defined as interest income to assets), 
average non-interest cost (ANIC, defined as non-interest expense to liabilities), and average non-interest revenue 
(ANIR, defined as non-interest income to assets). 
15 Variables include the unemployment rate (UNEM), population (POP), and the population growth rate (POPG). 
16 For the first set of regressions, we exclude the 1960s and most of the 1970s. The analysis runs from 1978 through 
  16
determine whether the lagged values of other dependent variables significantly explain (Granger 
cause) the movement of a given dependent variable. For example, do previous mergers per bank 
significantly affect charters per bank?17 While the Granger temporal-causality test determines 
whether changes in one variable (e.g., mergers per bank) lead changes in another variable (e.g., 
charters per bank), it does not determine whether there is an ongoing, long-run effect. Thus, we 
also test the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients equal zero. For example, do previous 
mergers per bank significantly affect charters per bank on an ongoing, cumulative basis? 
Finally, since the dependent variables each have a number of zero entries, we perform 
pooled and random-effect Tobit regressions in addition to the pooled OLS analysis. We 
implement robust or bootstrapping to the error process in each specification. 
Correlates with Bank New-Charter, Failure, and Merger Rates 
Results from Bank New-Charter Rate Regressions. Table 2 reports the regression results for bank 
charters to total banks (CH/BK).18 The number of branches per bank as well as the dummy 
variable for intrastate multibank holding company activity correlate positively with new bank 
charters per bank, although the second effect vanishes in the bootstrapping of the random-effects 
Tobit specification.19 More permissive intrastate branching regulation attracts new bank entry. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1998. 
17 Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White (1999), Keeton (2000), and Seelig and Critchfield (1999) debate that 
question as noted in our review of the literature. Those regressions employ the entire 1966 to 1998 data set, after 
allowing for three lagged values of the dependent variables. 
18 While the results do not generally change across the pooled OLS, pooled Tobit, and random-effects Tobit 
specifications, there are instances where different significance levels occur. 
19 The econometric software, Intercooled Stata 7.0, allows robust estimation for the pooled OLS and pooled Tobit 
specifications, but not for the random-effects Tobit specification. In that latter case, we employ bootstrapping with 
1000 repetitions to obtain confidence ranges on the coefficient estimates. The Tables report the t-statistics obtained 
by dividing the coefficient estimates by the bootstrap standard errors. That typically conforms to the bias-corrected 
confidence ranges. Where differences occur, we shall discuss in the footnotes and note in the Tables. 
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The magnitude of the branches-to-bank effect equals slightly more than 33 percent, which means 
that a one-standard deviation increase in branches to bank produces a slightly more than one-
third standard deviation increase in the new charter rate.20 The dummy variables capturing the 
effects of interstate holding company merger regulation do not provide strong or consistent 
findings. Based on the significant effects, allowing bank holding companies to merge across state 
lines associates negatively with new bank charters. In other words, states that permit bank 
holding company acquisitions from other states discourage new bank charters. 
States whose banks possess higher average loans to assets, equity to assets, or non-
interest earning deposits to deposits also experience significantly higher charters per bank. The 
significance of the equity to assets and non-interest earning deposits to deposits variables 
disappears when considering robust or bootstrap standard errors and/or the random-effects Tobit 
specification. The magnitude of the loans-to-assets effect equals 25 percent. Intuitively, banks 
holding higher loans, higher equity, and higher non-interest earning deposits should all 
experience higher net income, other things constant. That is, loans typically earn a higher interest 
return; while equity and non-interest earning deposits do not generate direct interest expenses for 
the bank. Thus, higher net income should attract new entry. In addition, higher net charge-offs to 
loans associate with higher new bank charters, although the significance only occurs at the 10-
percent level with the random-effects Tobit specification. At first glance, that result appears 
counterintuitive. But one rationalization suggests that higher net charge-offs signals imminent 
bank failure. As such, an increase in charters may reflect the market filling a potential gap in 
 
20 This calculation and those that follow concerning the magnitude of effects rely on the data in Table 1 in 
combination with the coefficient estimates. The magnitude effects reported below use the same notation – 
“magnitude equals X percent”. 
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banking services in such states. Alternatively, that result may reflect reverse causality where new 
banks with limited experience in banking operations may exhibit, on average, higher net charge-
offs as they learn the business. That alternative explanation, however, requires some time, 
possibly several years, to evolve, making that rationalization less likely.  
Next, non-interest expense to expense possesses a significant negative correlation with 
new charters per bank. Those results suggest that less-efficient, non-financial inputs, as 
measured by non-interest expense to expense, repels new banks. In other words, higher operating 
expenses erect a barrier to new bank charters. The magnitude of the non-interest-expense-to-
expense effect equals 80-percent. Finally, both population and population growth possess 
significant positive correlation with new bank charters per bank, although the significance of the 
population effect vanishes in the random-effect Tobit specification. Those findings indicate that 
a large and growing state needs more banking services.21 The magnitudes of the population and 
its growth-rate effects equal 10- and 20-percent, respectively. 
In sum, state-level deregulation of branching restrictions will, on average, encourage new 
entry, especially in states with a growing demand for banking services and with more-efficient 
non-financial inputs. Moreover, the non-interest expense to expense effect exhibits the largest 
magnitude. 
Results for Bank Failure Rate Regressions. Table 3 reports the regression results for bank 
failures to total banks. None of the regulatory variables exhibit significant effects on bank 
failures, except for the positive effect of branches per bank only in the pooled OLS specification. 
Thus, deregulation of intrastate and interstate branching and banking does not affect the pattern 
                                                 
21 Low population may also reflect the presence of more rural rather than urban markets within the state. 
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of bank failures. 
Several of the bank- and state-specific variables, however, do  significantly influence the 
failure rate. Not surprisingly, higher net charge-offs to loans possess a significant positive 
correlation with the bank failure rate. That is, riskier banking markets experience higher failure 
rates. The magnitude of the net-charge-offs-to-loans effect equals 75-percent. Higher non-
interest income to income and lower average non-interest revenue associates positively with the 
bank failure rate. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, non-interest income may signal a 
riskier bank strategy.22 The magnitude of the non-interest-income-to-income effect equals 130-
percent. Banks that generate revenue through non-interest sources may possess operating 
difficulties. The effect of average non-interest income may seem counterintuitive. Finally, 
limited evidence exists that a higher unemployment rate associates with a higher bank failure 
rate. That evidence largely appears in the pooled Tobit specification. 
In sum, a banking system that relies more heavily on non-interest income and 
experiences more net charge offs exhibits a higher average failure rate. Moreover, the non-
interest income effect exceeds the net charge off effect in magnitude. 
Results for Bank Merger Rate Regressions. Table 4 reports the regression results for bank 
mergers to total banks. The number of branches per bank and the existence of multibank holding 
company activity within a state associate positively with the bank merger rate and states with 
national bank holding company merger legislation without reciprocity possess higher mergers 
per bank. That is, states with a regulatory stance that permits mergers experience a higher merger 
                                                 
22 Conventional wisdom suggests that banks reduce their risk when they diversify from only interest income to 
interest and non-interest income. Stiroh (2002) and DeYoung and Roland (2001) also find that non-interest income 
leads to riskier bank operations. 
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rate, other things constant. The magnitude of the branches-per-bank effect equals 35-percent. 
Also, the magnitudes of the dummy-variable effects for states with multibank holding company 
legislation, either locally (i.e., within the state) or nationally, equal 39 and 79 percent, 
respectively. 
Higher non-interest expense to expense and lower non-interest deposits to deposits 
significantly associate with higher bank mergers. Also, higher average interest cost and to a 
lesser extent, lower average interest revenue associate positively with the bank merger rate. 
Those effects all seem consonant with poor performing banks, on average, within a state. 
Further, the magnitudes of the non-interest-expense-to-expense, non-interest-deposits-to-
deposits, average-interest-cost, and average-interest-revenue effects equal more than 70, 25, 55, 
and 30 percent, respectively. 
In sum, the regulatory structure in a state significantly affects merger activity. States with 
more permissive branching and multibank holding company legislation associate with higher 
merger rates. Moreover, states with relatively poor bank performance – high non-interest 
expense to expense, high interest bearing deposits to deposits, high average interest cost, and low 
average interest revenue – spawn higher merger rates. 
Timing Relationships between New-Charter, Failure, and Merger Rates 
Table 5 reports the timing (Granger causality) results as well as the accumulation of lagged 
effects for new-charter, failure, and merger rates.23 Strong evidence exists that mergers within a 
 
23 Although researchers typically apply Granger (temporal) causality tests in a time series setting, a few researchers 
adopt Granger causality in a panel data setting. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988, 1989) provide a good 
theoretical foundation while Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) and Podrecca and Carmeci (2001) report useful 
applications. In addition, equation-by-equation regression results appear in the appendix in Tables A1, A2, and A3. 
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state precede new charters. That is, more mergers lead to more new charters across all 
specifications. That finding supports the results reported in Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and 
White (1999) and in Keeton (2000), but counters those in Seelig and Critchfield (1999). The 
evidence also suggests that an increase in bank failures per bank lead a reduction in bank 
mergers. That effect, however, receives weaker support when robust and bootstrap standard 
errors are calculated.  
Table 5 also reports results for the long-run, cumulative effects. Here, the findings 
suggest that more mergers per bank lead to a cumulative increase in new charters per bank. 
Moreover, more failures per bank also lead to a cumulative increase in mergers. Once again, 
weaker support for the last findings emerges with robust and bootstrap standard errors. 
5. Conclusion 
Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry 
beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers 
of mergers and acquisitions. Less well documented, but equally important, was the continuing 
entry of new banks, tempering the decline in the overall number of banking institutions. 
Prior research (Amos, 1992; Cebula, 1994) considers the proximate causes of commercial 
bank failure rates, using cross-section data across states.24 While Amos (1992) finds no 
significant effects of intrastate branching dummy variables, Cebula (1994) discovers that limited 
branching states experience significantly lower failure rates than statewide or unit branching 
states. Cebula’s results, however, raise questions, since it seems inappropriate to lump statewide 
 
24 Chou and Cebula (1996) perform similar analysis on the savings and loan failure rate, using a cross-section data 
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and unit branching states under the same “homogeneous” umbrella. 
In addition to deaths (failures), this paper examines births and marriages in the U.S. 
commercial banking industry. We perform two regression analyses. The first analysis tests for 
the correlates with birth, death, and marriage rates from a set of balance sheet and income 
variables, macroeconomic variables, and regulatory variables. The second analysis tests the 
temporal relationships between birth, death, and marriage rates. 
Several general findings boiled to the surface. First, among the set of significant 
correlates with birth, death, and marriage rates several deserve mention. States with more 
branches per bank and states that permit multibank holding company activity within its borders 
correlate positively with new charters per bank and mergers per bank. That is, more-permissive 
state-level intrastate branching regulation correlates with more new charters and mergers.25 We 
find, unlike Cebula (1994), no evidence that intrastate branching regulation correlates with the 
failure rate. Moreover, Stiroh and Strahan (2002) report significant evidence that intrastate and 
interstate branching and banking deregulation enhances the exit rate, where exit means mergers 
and failures. Our results match the Stiroh and Strahan’s findings, if their results reflect mergers 
rather than failures. 
Interestingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, the interstate branching and banking 
dummy variables possess few significant effects in birth, death, and marriage regressions, at least 
through 1998. The passage of interstate multibank holding company activity without reciprocity 
does significantly associate with increased merger activity. Coupling that lack of significant 
 
across states. 
25 Remember that we measure state-level branching regulation by its effect (i.e., average number of branches per 
bank) rather than dummy variables for unit, limited, and statewide branching states. 
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effects with the significant effects for the variable capturing intrastate branching effects (i.e., 
branches to banks and intrastate multibank holding company activity), we conclude that the 
birth, death, and marriage variables responded more to intrastate deregulation than to interstate 
deregulation.26 While our findings do not rule out possible future effects of interstate banking and 
branching deregulation on births, deaths, and marriages, we find little evidence of such effects 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century. In other words, the last major piece of relevant 
legislation that authorized full interstate branching and banking has yet to see significant effects 
on births, deaths, and marriages. 
In addition, mergers temporally lead new charters, supporting the findings of Berger, 
Bonime, Goldberg, and White (1999) and Keeton (2000), but countering the results of Seelig and 
Critchfield (1999). In addition, failures temporally lead mergers, although not as strongly as the 
first temporal causality finding. In other words, failures may produce a wake-up call for other 
weak banks. Those banks should entertain merger possibilities on an accelerated time line. 
In sum, intrastate and interstate deregulation of banking and branching activity has 
promoted significant consolidation, both on a national and state-by-state basis. That 
consolidation process has proceeded more slowly than many analysts projected, as new bank 
entry has cushioned the decline in banking institutions. We find that deregulation, especially 
intrastate branching, associates with higher merger and new charter rates. In addition, mergers 
temporally lead new charters, suggesting that mergers open opportunities for new bank entry. 
Some analysts and regulators raise concerns about the future of small community banks 
and the availability of small business lending. Our findings offer some solace that community 
 
26 Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) report a similar pattern whereby “banks’ efficiency improves sharply once 
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banks will continue to exist and prosper. If unmet demand for small business lending emerges, 
the existing regulatory environment leaves open the door to the entry of new banks. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Variables 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Structural Regressions 
CH/BK 1071 0.0228 0.0363 0.0000 0.3333 
MG/BK 1071 0.0404 0.0471 0.0000 0.3380 
FL/BK 1071 0.0095 0.0292 0.0000 0.5000 
BR/BK 1071 7.3935 6.6184 0.0256 38.6607 
MBH 1071 0.9300 0.2553 0.0000 1.0000 
DREG 1071 0.1755 0.3806 0.0000 1.0000 
DNATNR 1071 0.2493 0.4328 0.0000 1.0000 
DNATR 1071 0.1429 0.3501 0.0000 1.0000 
EQ/A 1071 0.0754 0.0149 -0.0071 0.1560 
L/A 1071 0.5824 0.0793 0.3593 0.8229 
REL/L 1071 0.3990 0.1286 0.0533 0.8353 
CIL/L 1071 0.2664 0.0822 0.0286 0.5446 
CL/L 1071 0.2359 0.1287 0.0459 0.9037 
NCOFF/L 1071 0.0077 0.0080 -0.0027 0.0871 
D/A 1071 0.7930 0.0896 0.3001 0.9125 
DNI/D 1071 0.2237 0.0727 0.0597 0.5284 
NIY/Y 1071 0.1353 0.0750 0.0380 0.5874 
NIE/E 1071 0.4341 0.1038 0.1675 0.7743 
AIC 1071 0.0498 0.0157 0.0173 0.1072 
AIR 1071 0.0846 0.0147 0.0406 0.1394 
ANIC 1071 0.0369 0.0100 0.0189 0.1100 
ANIR 1071 0.0139 0.0124 0.0034 0.1186 
ASSET 1071 0.4515 0.9008 0.0211 12.9000 
UNEM 1071 0.0631 0.0214 0.0000 0.1802 
POP  1071 4.8146 5.2477 0.4010 32.6828 
POPG 1071 0.0095 0.0121 -0.0391 0.0811 
 
 
Granger Causality Regressions 
CH/BK 1530 0.0218 0.0342 0.0000 0.3333 
CH/BK(-1) 1530 0.0208 0.0329 0.0000 0.3333 
CH/BK(-2) 1530 0.0201 0.0324 0.0000 0.3333 
CH/BK(-3) 1530 0.0195 0.0320 0.0000 0.3333 
MG/BK 1530 0.0328 0.0437 0.0000 0.3380 
MG/BK(-1) 1530 0.0312 0.0431 0.0000 0.3380 
MG/BK(-2) 1530 0.0286 0.0400 0.0000 0.3380 
MG/BK(-3) 1530 0.0269 0.0379 0.0000 0.3380 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Variables (continued) 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Granger Causality Regressions 
FL/BK 1530 0.0068 0.0249 0.0000 0.5000 
FL/BK(-1) 1530 0.0065 0.0245 0.0000 0.5000 
FL/BK(-2) 1530 0.0063 0.0244 0.0000 0.5000 
FL/BK(-3) 1530 0.0056 0.0202 0.0000 0.2857 
 
Note:  The variables are defined as follows: CH/BK = new bank charters to banks; MG/BK = 
bank mergers to banks; FL/BK = bank failures to banks; BR/BK = branches to banks; 
MBH = dummy variable equal to 1 if the state introduced acquisitions by multibank 
holding companies within the state; zero otherwise; DREG = dummy variable for states 
with regional interstate bank holding company mergers; DNATNR = dummy variable for 
states with national interstate bank holding company mergers with no reciprocity; 
DNATR = dummy variable for states with national interstate bank holding company 
mergers with reciprocity; EQ/A = equity to assets; L/A = loans to assets; REL/L = real 
estate loans to loans; CIL/L = commercial and industrial loans to loans; CL/L = 
consumer loans to loans; NCOFF/L = net charge-offs to loans; D/A = deposits to assets; 
DNI/D = non-interest-earning deposits to deposits; NIY/Y non-interest income to 
income; NIE/E non-interest expense to expense; AIC = average interest cost (interest 
expense to liabilities); AIR = average interest revenue (interest income to assets); ANIC 
= average non-interest cost (non-interest expense to liabilities; ANIR = average non-
interest revenue (non-interest income to assets); ASSET = the average level of bank 
assets; UNEM = unemployment rate; POP = population; and POPG = population growth 
rate. The numbers in parentheses after the independent variables stand for the lag length. 
For example, FL/BK(-3) is bank failures to banks lagged three years. 
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Table 2: Structural Regressions on New Bank Charters to Banks 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
TOBIT 
Random-Effects 
TOBIT 
Variables 
Ordinary Robust Ordinary Robust Ordinary Bootstrap 
Constant -0.0669 
(-1.51) 
-0.0669
(-1.47)
-0.0843
(-1.45)
-0.0843
(-1.06)
0.0042 
(0.07) 
BR/BK 0.0019* 
(8.76) 
0.0019*
(5.97)
0.0018*
(6.48)
0.0018*
(3.23)
0.0020* 
(6.33) 
0.0020**
(2.26)
MBH 0.0103** 
(2.37) 
0.0103**
(3.85)
0.0144*
(2.51)
0.0144†
(1.88)
0.0092 
(1.59) 
0.0092
(1.26)
DREG -0.0017 
(-0.48) 
-0.0017
(-0.45)
-0.0010
(-0.22)
-0.0010
(-0.15)
-0.0046 
(-0.98) 
-0.0046
(-0.76)
DNATNR 0.0034 
(0.87) 
0.0034
(0.91)
0.0077
(1.46)
0.0077
(0.86)
0.0038 
(0.63) 
0.0038
(0.43)
DNATR -0.0080** 
(-1.96) 
-0.0080**
(-2.46)
-0.0099†
(-1.84)
-0.0099
(-1.38)
-0.0079 
(-1.39) 
-0.0079
(-1.11)
EQ/A 0.2988* 
(2.96) 
0.2988†
(1.87)
0.3715*
(2.80)
0.3715
(1.18)
0.3318** 
(2.35) 
0.3318
(1.11)
L/A 0.0945* 
(5.02) 
0.0945*
(4.51)
0.1367*
(5.44)
0.1367*
(3.33)
0.1190* 
(4.64) 
0.1190*
(3.01)
REL/L -0.0067 
(-0.41) 
-0.0067
(-0.37)
-0.0189
(-0.89)
-0.0189
(-0.48)
-0.0145 
(-0.42) 
-0.0145
(-0.28)
CIL/L 0.0078 
(0.28) 
0.0078
(0.30)
0.0152
(0.42)
0.0152
(0.27)
0.0687 
(1.33) 
0.0687
(0.99)
CL/L 0.0316 
(1.49) 
0.0316
(1.52)
0.0502†
(1.80)
0.0502
(1.40)
-0.0207 
(-0.57) 
-0.0207
(-0.28)
NCOFF/L 0.6350* 
(3.62) 
0.6350*
(3.93)
0.8784*
(3.80)
0.8784*
(3.66)
0.4024† 
(1.83) 
0.4024†
(1.10)
D/A 0.0081 
(0.33) 
0.0081
(0.28)
0.0277
(0.85)
0.0277
(0.60)
0.0234 
(0.70) 
0.0234
(0.41)
DNI/D 0.0758* 
(3.69) 
0.0758*
(3.61)
0.1096*
(4.01)
0.1096**
(2.04)
0.0121 
(0.40) 
0.0121
(0.22)
NIY/Y 0.0300 
(0.37) 
0.0300
(0.31)
0.2242**
(2.05)
0.2242
(1.40)
0.0507 
(0.48) 
0.0507
(0.20)
NIE/E -0.1177 
(-1.60) 
-0.1177†
(-1.67)
-0.2418**
(-2.47)
-0.2418**
(-2.51)
-0.2761* 
(-3.02) 
-0.2761**
(-2.40)
AIC -0.1508 
(-0.32) 
-0.1508
(-0.31)
-0.3161
(-0.50)
-0.3161
(-0.46)
-0.7677 
(-1.26) 
-0.7677
(-0.95)
AIR -0.0250 
(-0.08) 
-0.0250
(-0.07)
-0.1516
(-0.37)
-0.1516
(-0.27)
-0.0581 
(-0.15) 
-0.0581
(-0.09)
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Table 2: Structural Regressions on New Bank Charters to Bank (continued) 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
TOBIT 
Random-Effects 
TOBIT 
Variables 
Ordinary Robust Ordinary Robust Ordinary Bootstrap 
ANIC 0.3804 
(0.71) 
0.3804
(0.67)
0.5390
(0.76)
0.5390
(0.64)
0.3489 
(0.52) 
0.3489
(0.33)
ANIR -0.3666 
(-0.74) 
-0.3666
(-0.63)
-1.2722†
(-1.91)
-1.2722
(-1.21)
0.2017 
(0.31) 
0.2017
(0.11)
ASSET -0.0056 
(-0.36) 
-0.0056
(-0.22)
-0.0097
(-0.48)
-0.0097
(-0.33)
0.0012 
(0.61) 
0.0012
(0.17)
UNEM -0.0601 
(-0.96) 
-0.0601
(-1.00)
-0.0659
(-0.80)
-0.0659
(-0.58)
-0.1056 
(-1.15) 
-0.1056
(-0.76)
POP 0.0005* 
(2.64) 
0.0005**
(2.22)
0.0008*
(2.89)
0.0008**
(2.31)
0.0002 
(0.59) 
0.0002
(0.15)
POPG 0.3045* 
(3.32) 
0.3045*
(3.70)
0.4106*
(3.40)
0.4106**
(2.07)
0.5698* 
(4.09) 
0.5698*
(2.80)
Adjusted 
R2 
0.1938 0.1938  
Note: See Table 1. The dependent variable is new bank charters to banks (CH/BK). Regressions include pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS), pooled Tobit, and random-effects Tobit specifications. Finally, we report t-
statistics suing robust standard errors for the pooled OLS and pooled Tobit specifications and bootstrap 
standard errors for the random-effects Tobit specification. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
† means significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 3: Structural Regressions on Bank Failures to Banks 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
TOBIT 
Random-Effects 
TOBIT 
Variables 
Ordinary Robust Ordinary Robust Ordinary Bootstrap 
Constant 0.0259 
(0.74) 
0.0259
(0.44)
0.0373
(0.49)
0.0373
(0.35)
0.0712 
(0.88) 
BR/BK 0.0007* 
(4.11) 
0.0007†
(1.80)
0.0003
(0.72)
0.0003
(0.38)
0.0007 
(1.39) 
0.0007
(0.48)
MBH -0.0008 
(-0.22) 
-0.0008
(-0.55)
0.0035
(0.43)
0.0035
(0.45)
0.0018 
(0.21) 
0.0018
(0.18)
DREG -0.0035 
(-1.27) 
-0.0035
(-1.23)
-0.0050
(-0.86)
-0.0050
(-0.91)
-0.0031 
(-0.52) 
-0.0031
(-0.54)
DNATNR -0.0007 
(-0.22) 
-0.0007
(-0.23)
-0.0050
(-0.77)
-0.0050
(-0.69)
-0.0049 
(-0.72) 
-0.0049
(-0.59)
DNATR 0.0018 
(0.58) 
0.0018
(0.57)
-0.0015
(-0.23)
-0.0015
(-0.23)
0.0016 
(0.23) 
0.0016
(0.20)
EQ/A 0.0075 
(0.09) 
0.0075
(0.07)
0.0366
(0.21)
0.0366
(0.19)
0.1660 
(0.85) 
0.1660
(0.51)
L/A -0.0366** 
(-2.46) 
-0.0366
(-0.85)
-0.0748**
(-2.37)
-0.0748
(-0.84)
-0.0931* 
(-2.66) 
-0.0931
(-0.84)
REL/L 0.0274** 
(2.13) 
0.0274
(1.47)
0.0389
(1.38)
0.0389
(0.91)
0.0342 
(1.04) 
0.0342
(0.46)
CIL/L -0.0160 
(-0.73) 
-0.0160
(-0.75)
0.0072
(0.15)
0.0072
(0.17)
0.0039 
(0.07) 
0.0039
(0.06)
CL/L -0.0277† 
(-1.65) 
-0.0277†
(-1.86)
-0.0462
(-1.20)
-0.0462
(-1.06)
-0.0418 
(-0.97) 
-0.0418
(-0.67)
NCOFF/L 1.7067* 
(12.32) 
1.7067*
(6.03)
2.9723*
(10.88)
2.9723*
(9.65)
2.8775* 
(10.30) 
2.8775*
(7.83)
D/A 0.0056 
(0.29) 
0.0056
(0.20)
0.0203
(0.48)
0.0203
(0.32)
0.0112 
(0.25) 
0.0112
(0.15)
DNI/D 0.0104 
(0.64) 
0.0104
(0.68)
-0.1079*
(-2.76)
-0.1079†
(-1.81)
-0.1234* 
(-2.91) 
-0.1234†
(-1.63)
NIY/Y 0.1291** 
(2.01) 
0.1291†
(1.89)
0.5621*
(3.97)
0.5621*
(2.73)
0.5151* 
(3.50) 
0.5151**
(2.00)
NIE/E -0.0518 
(-0.89) 
-0.0518
(-0.82)
-0.1829
(-1.47)
-0.1829
(-1.25)
-0.2087† 
(-1.66) 
-0.2087
(-0.97)
AIC -0.1219 
(-0.32) 
-0.1219
(-0.18)
-0.7269
(-0.90)
-0.7269
(-0.54)
-0.7974 
(-0.97) 
-0.7974
(-0.48)
AIR -0.1302 
(-0.53) 
-0.1302
(-0.26)
0.0755
(0.14)
0.0755
(0.07)
0.0026 
(0.00) 
0.0026
(0.00)
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Table 3: Structural Regressions on Bank Failures to Banks (continued) 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
TOBIT 
Random-Effects 
TOBIT 
Variables 
Ordinary Robust Ordinary Robust Ordinary Bootstrap 
ANIC 0.3231 
(0.76) 
0.3231
(0.69)
0.4161
(0.44)
0.4161
(0.33)
0.5191 
(0.54) 
0.5191
(0.39)
ANIR -0.8554** 
(-2.18) 
-0.8554†
(-1.75)
-2.8780*
(-3.18)
-2.8780*
(-2.95)
-2.7969* 
(-2.99) 
-2.7969**
(-2.04)
ASSET 0.0013 
(0.11) 
0.0013
(0.04)
0.0041
(0.17)
0.0041
(0.12)
0.0054 
(0.21) 
0.0054
(0.06)
UNEM 0.0516 
(1.04) 
0.0516
(1.31)
0.2071**
(1.96)
0.2071**
(1.98)
0.2161† 
(1.89) 
0.2161
(1.46)
POP -0.0001 
(-0.78) 
-0.0001
(-1.13)
0.0003
(1.04)
0.0003
(0.83)
0.0004 
(0.88) 
0.0004
(0.47)
POPG -0.0569 
(-0.79) 
-0.0569
(-1.04)
-0.0043
(-0.03)
-0.0043
(-0.04)
-0.0479 
(-0.28) 
-0.0479
(-0.25)
Adjusted 
R2 
0.2215 0.2215  
Note: See Table 1. The dependent variable is bank mergers to banks (MG/BK). 
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Table 4: Structural Regressions on Bank Mergers to Banks 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
TOBIT 
Random-Effects 
TOBIT 
Variables 
Ordinary Robust Ordinary Robust Ordinary Bootstrap 
Constant -0.0794 
(-1.39) 
-0.0794
(-1.36)
-0.1394†
(-1.95)
-0.1394
(-1.47)
-0.1164 
(-1.51) 
BR/BK 0.0018* 
(6.29) 
0.0018*
(4.50)
0.0018*
(5.34)
0.0018*
(2.94)
0.0025* 
(4.92) 
0.0025†
(1.78)
MBH 0.0065 
(1.15) 
0.0065**
(2.26)
0.0166**
(2.21)
0.0166†
(1.74)
0.0186** 
(2.32) 
0.0186†
(1.63)
DREG 0.0046 
(1.02) 
0.0046
(1.03)
0.0086
(1.55)
0.0086
(1.14)
0.0045 
(0.77) 
0.0045
(0.66)
DNATNR 0.0265* 
(5.16) 
0.0265*
(4.26)
0.0334*
(5.31)
0.0334*
(3.65)
0.0319* 
(4.51) 
0.0319*
(3.16)
DNATR 0.0002 
(0.04) 
0.0002
(0.04)
0.0009
(0.14)
0.0009
(0.10)
-0.0027 
(-0.39) 
-0.0027
(-0.29)
EQ/A -0.0242 
(-0.18) 
-0.0242
(-0.13)
-0.1743
(-1.04)
-0.1743
(-0.75)
0.1444 
(0.74) 
0.1444
(0.50)
L/A -0.0407† 
(-1.67) 
-0.0407
(-1.32)
-0.0556†
(-1.85)
-0.0556
(-1.30)
-0.0767** 
(-2.19) 
-0.0767
(-1.29)
REL/L 0.0712* 
(3.38) 
0.0712*
(3.42)
0.1029*
(3.79)
0.1029**
(2.46)
0.0765** 
(2.09) 
0.0765a 
(1.40)
CIL/L 0.0987* 
(2.73) 
0.0987*
(2.80)
0.1429*
(3.06)
0.1429**
(2.07)
0.1209** 
(2.08) 
0.1209
(1.16)
CL/L 0.0954* 
(3.47) 
0.0954*
(4.23)
0.1567*
(4.39)
0.1567*
(2.71)
0.1340* 
(2.99) 
0.1340†a 
(1.88)
NCOFF/L -0.0895* 
(-0.39) 
-0.0895*
(-0.36)
-0.1230
(-0.45)
-0.1230
(-0.27)
0.2841 
(0.99) 
0.2841
(0.49)
D/A 0.0142 
(0.45) 
0.0142
(0.42)
0.0239
(0.61)
0.0239
(0.42)
0.0156 
(0.36) 
0.0156
(0.23)
DNI/D -0.0957* 
(-3.60) 
-0.0957*
(-3.78)
-0.1606*
(-4.75)
-0.1606*
(-3.55)
-0.1766* 
(-4.61) 
-0.1766*
(-3.98)
NIY/Y -0.1672 
(-1.58) 
-0.1672
(-1.10)
-0.1257
(-0.98)
-0.1257
(-0.96)
-0.3013** 
(-2.16) 
-0.3013
(-1.44)
NIE/E 0.2083** 
(2.19) 
0.2083†
(1.94)
0.3107*
(2.68)
0.3107*
(2.53)
0.3250* 
(2.80) 
0.3250*
(2.68)
AIC 0.9884 
(1.60) 
0.9884
(1.49)
1.9769*
(2.58)
1.9769†
(1.75)
1.7246** 
(2.23) 
1.7246†
(1.76)
AIR -0.5836 
(-1.46) 
-0.5836
(-1.34)
-1.2067**
(-2.39)
-1.2067
(-1.36)
-1.1181** 
(-2.15) 
-1.1181
(-1.36)
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Table 4: Structural Regressions on Bank Mergers to Banks (continued) 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
TOBIT 
Random-Effects 
TOBIT 
Variables 
Ordinary Robust Ordinary Robust Ordinary Bootstrap 
ANIC -0.5313 
(-0.76) 
-0.5313
(-0.74)
-1.1165
(-1.30)
-1.1165
(-1.24)
-1.2304 
(-1.39) 
-1.2304
(-1.13)
ANIR 0.6714 
(1.05) 
0.6714
(0.84)
0.7091
(0.91)
0.7091
(0.81)
1.3578 
(1.62) 
1.3578
(0.96)
ASSET -0.0221 
(-1.08) 
-0.0221
(-0.81)
-0.0353
(-1.44)
-0.0353
(-0.74)
-0.0199 
(-0.75) 
-0.0199
(-0.18)
UNEM -0.0826 
(-1.02) 
-0.0826
(-1.22)
-0.0561
(-0.56)
-0.0561
(-0.50)
-0.0248 
(-0.21) 
-0.0248
(-0.23)
POP 0.0003 
(0.99) 
0.0003
(1.02)
0.0005†
(1.65)
0.0005
(1.09)
0.0008 
(1.34) 
0.0008
(0.89)
POPG 0.0048 
(-0.04) 
0.0048
(-0.04)
-0.0412*
(-0.28)
-0.0412*
(-0.50)
0.1908 
(1.01) 
0.1908
(0.68)
Adjusted 
R2 
0.1959 0.1959  
Note: See Table 1. The dependent variable is bank failures to banks (FL/BK). 
 
a The bias-corrected 95-percent confidence range for the bootstrap excluded zero while the t-statistic using 
the bootstrap standard error rejects coefficients different from zero at the 5-percent level. See footnote 16 
for more details. 
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Table 5: Granger Causality and Cumulative Sum Tests 
 
New-Charter Rate Regressions 
 
Lagged 
Terms 
____Pooled OLS___ 
 
Granger              Sum 
___Pooled TOBIT__ 
 
Granger              Sum 
Random-Effect 
TOBIT 
Granger              Sum 
Failure  
Rate 
0.36 0.05 0.74 1.04 2.23 1.04 
Merger  
Rate 
12.42* 34.88* 10.26* 28.22* 30.72* 28.17* 
Failure Rate Regressions 
 
Lagged 
Terms 
____Pooled OLS___ 
 
Granger              Sum 
___Pooled TOBIT__ 
 
Granger              Sum 
Random-Effect 
TOBIT 
Granger              Sum 
Charter 
Rate 
2.15† 5.90** 1.78 2.57 5.35 2.57 
Merger  
Rate 
1.01 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.63 0.24 
Merger Rate Regressions 
 
Lagged 
Terms 
____Pooled OLS___ 
 
Granger              Sum 
___Pooled TOBIT__ 
 
Granger              Sum 
Random-Effect 
TOBIT 
Granger              Sum 
Charter 
Rate 
0.50 0.66 1.21 2.01 3.63 2.01 
Failure  
Rate 
13.53* 19.34* 10.11* 12.24** 30.34* 12.24* 
Note: The dependent variables are new-charters to banks (CH/BK), failures to banks (FL/BK), and mergers 
to banks (MG/BK). All regressions employed pooled data and include three lags of each right-side 
variable. The test statistics for the Granger causality tests in the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and pooled Tobit regressions are F-statistics (3, 1520) and for the Granger causality tests in the 
random-effects Tobit regressions are χ2-statistics with 3 degrees of freedom. The statistic testing for 
the sum of the coefficients equal to zero is an F-statistic (1, 1520) for the OLS and pooled Tobit 
regressions and a χ2-statistic with 1 degree of freedom for the random-effects Tobit regressions. 
 
* means significant at the 1-percent level. 
** means significant at the 5-percent level. 
† means significant at the 10-percent level. 
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Appendix: 
 
Table A1: Time-Series Regressions on Bank New-Charters to Banks 
 
Variables Pooled  
OLS 
Pooled  
TOBIT 
Random-Effect 
TOBIT 
Constant 0.0038*
(3.39)
-0.0055*
(-3.70)
-0.0055*
(3.69)
CH/BK(-1) 0.3942*
(15.06)
0.4486*
(13.25)
0.4484*
(13.24)
CH/BK(-2) 0.2385*
(8.77)
0.2796*
(7.87)
0.2794*
(7.87)
CH/BK(-3) 0.0419
(1.57)
0.0352
(0.99)
0.0349
(0.99)
MG/BK(-1) 0.0658*
(3.45)
0.0768*
(3.02)
0.0768*
(3.02)
MG/BK(-2) 0.0274
(1.31)
0.0195
(0.69)
0.0195
(0.69)
MG/BK(-3) 0.0510**
(2.40)
0.0726*
(2.61)
0.0726*
(2.61)
FL/BK(-1) -0.0134
(-0.41)
-0.0513
(-1.11)
-0.0512
(-1.11)
FL/BK(-2) 0.0386
(1.03)
0.0438
(0.87)
0.0439
(0.87)
FL/BK(-3) -0.0157
(-0.37)
-0.0517
(-0.89)
-0.0518
(-0.89)
Adjusted R2 
 
0.3294
Note: The dependent variable is new bank charters to banks (CH/BK). Other independent variables are 
defined as follows: MG/BK = bank mergers to banks and FL/BK = bank failures to banks. The 
numbers in parentheses after the independent variables stand for the lag length. For example, 
FL/BK(-3) is bank failures to banks lagged three years. ). Regressions include pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS), pooled Tobit, and random-effects Tobit specifications. 
 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
† means significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level. 
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Table A2: Time-Series Regressions on Bank Failures to Banks 
 
Variables Pooled  
OLS 
Pooled  
TOBIT 
Random-Effect 
TOBIT 
Constant 0.0020**
(2.23)
-0.0367*
(-13.41)
-0.0362*
(-15.46)
CH/BK(-1) 0.0030
(0.14)
-0.0560
(-0.96)
0.0923**
(2.21)
CH/BK(-2) 0.0280
(1.29)
0.0785
(1.41)
0.1992*
(5.27)
CH/BK(-3) 0.0221
(1.04)
0.0672
(1.22)
0.0166
(0.36)
MG/BK(-1) -0.0170
(-1.12)
-0.0160
(-0.40)
0.0543†
(1.67)
MG/BK(-2) 0.0260
(1.57)
0.0166
(0.38)
-0.0155
(-0.45)
MG/BK(-3) 0.0001
(0.01)
0.0240
(0.56)
0.0608†
(1.91)
FL/BK(-1) 0.3762*
(14.34)
0.5645*
(9.83)
0.2053*
(5.54)
FL/BK(-2) 0.0117
(0.39)
0.0484
(0.70)
0.0662
(1.21)
FL/BK(-3) 0.1826*
(5.45)
0.3501*
(4.69)
0.0886
(1.27)
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1992
Note: See Table A1. The dependent variable is bank failures to banks (FL/BK). 
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Table A3: Time-Series Regressions on Bank Mergers to Banks 
 
Variables Pooled  
OLS 
Pooled  
TOBIT 
Random-Effect 
TOBIT 
Constant 0.0133*
(8.85)
-0.0041†
(-1.90)
-0.0041†
(-1.90)
CH/BK(-1) 0.0153
(0.43)
0.0034
(0.07)
0.0034
(0.07)
CH/BK(-2) -0.0393
(-1.07)
-0.0886†
(-1.65)
-0.0887†
(-1.65)
CH/BK(-3) -0.0062
(-0.17)
0.0125
(0.25)
0.0125
(0.25)
MG/BK(-1) 0.2493*
(9.65)
0.3277*
(9.57)
0.3277*
(9.57)
MG/BK(-2) 0.2077*
(7.35)
0.2963*
(7.91)
0.2963*
(7.91)
MG/BK(-3) 0.1793*
(6.21)
0.2499*
(6.51)
0.2499*
(6.51)
FL/BK(-1) 0.2512*
(5.62)
0.2765*
(4.69)
0.2765*
(4.69)
FL/BK(-2) -0.1379*
(-2.72)
-0.2024*
(-2.94)
-0.2024*
(-2.94)
FL/BK(-3) 0.1417**
(2.48)
0.1918**
(2.53)
0.1918**
(2.53)
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2457
Note: See Table A1. The dependent variable is bank mergers to banks (MG/BK). 
 
